Saturday, September 7, 2013

LTTE’s procurement network

LTTE’s procurement network and the Chinese factor

War on terror revisited:

 

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Part 36

By Shamindra Ferdinando

One-time Sri Lankan Army chief and High Commissioner in Islamabad, Gen. Gerry H. de Silva discussed the importance of Sri Lanka having an uninterrupted supply of arms, ammunition and equipment to face any emergency.

The Gemunu Watch (GW) Regiment veteran highlighted a major crisis experienced by the Sri Lankan military, on the eve of the then Sri Lanka’s largest ever combined forces operation, Riviresa, which brought the Jaffna town under GoSL control in early Dec, 1995.

Addressing a one-day confab in Colombo on Feb. 23,2005, on Pakistan-Sri Lanka relations, Gen. Silva recalled how Pakistan had airlifted urgently needed weapons and ammunition when supplies from Sri Lanka’s main supplier China were delayed due to some reason. Gen. Silva appreciated Pakistan pulling out weapons and ammunition from operational areas to meet Sri Lanka’s requirement.

Five years later, Pakistan airlifted Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) for deployment in the Jaffna peninsula, in the immediate aftermath of the LTTE capturing the strategic Elephant Pass base in April 2000.

The seminar, organised by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, in collaboration with the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), attracted many experts from both countries. Gen. Silva emphasised that the military was able to thwart LTTE efforts primarily due to what he called prompt and ready military assistance provided by China and Pakistan. A grateful Silva said: "Assistance received from these two friendly nations was always prompt, well within the budget and well suited to our servicemen."

Sri Lanka never made an all-out effort to prevent the LTTE from acquiring arms, ammunition and equipment until the Rajapaksa government made representations to the People’s Republic of China as regards terrorists receiving a range of Chinese weapons. The GoSL produced irrefutable evidence to prove that brand new weapons of Chinese origin were in the hands of the LTTE. In fact, the LTTE primarily used Chinese equipment, including artillery and mortars, though it obtained equipment manufactured in various parts of the world.

Capture of ‘Indumathie’

On the evening of June 19, 2008, the Sea Tigers mounted a large scale raid on Point Pedro in the Jaffna peninsula. The attacking party comprised 24 craft, including four explosives laden boats, operated by suicide cadres. However, the navy, backed by land based SLA artillery launched a heavy counter attack forcing the Sea Tigers to withdraw, leaving one large attack craft. It was the largest Sea Tiger attack craft captured by the navy during the entire war. The vessel, just five metres shorter than the SLN21- meter long Israeli built Fast Attack Craft (FAC) believed to be of Indonesian make, was mounted with five weapons–one 14.4 mm twin-barrelled anti-aircraft weapons and four 7.62 multi-purpose machine guns-all of Chinese origin. It was powered by four Japanese Yamaha 250 horsepower outboard motors (OBMs). The vessel was towed to Kankesanthurai, the SLN’s Northern area headquarters, where they found four bodies of Sea Tigers, possibly including the body of the man who led the operation. The SLN assertion was based on the fact that the captured vessel carried four communication sets, for boat-to-boat and boat-to-land communication. Interestingly, ‘Indumathie’ was equipped with Japanese JRC radar as well as US Gamin GPS (Global Positioning System) of South Korean make (SLN captures LTTE attack craft with strap line Shore-based SLA artillery help thwart attack––The Island June 21, 2007).

The captured vessel was among five Sea Tiger craft destroyed off Point Pedro. The SLAF deployed Mi 24 helicopter gunships in support of the SLN. The battle highlighted the importance of combined fire comprising FACs, shore-based artillery and multi barrelled rocket launchers as well as heli-fire in thwarting an LTTE raid. (Tuesday’s battle highlights SLA’s critical role in defence of Jaffna coastline with strap line Captured craft had Japanese radar, Chinese guns and US direction finding equipment––The Island June 22, 2007).

The LTTE for the June 19, 2007 battle, deployed 16 craft similar to the one captured by the SLN. Hence, they, too, may have been equipped with US and Japanese equipment and mounted with Chinese guns. According to the navy, this particular craft had been built at an Indonesian boatyard to the Sea Tigers’ own specifications. Sea Tigers categorised them as ‘Wave Rider’ class.

Unfortunately, both the SLA and SLN claimed the lion’s share of credit for the successful counter attack causing friction among a section of the top brass. The SLA claimed that the SLN was able to capture ‘Indumathie’ only after the vessel had been disabled by SLA artillery, whereas the SLN insisted FAC (P 412) targeted Sea Tiger craft with a 107 mm rocket, also of Chinese origin. The SLN said that ‘Indumathie’ had also been hit by 30 mm Bushmaster weapon mounted on some of the Fast Attack Craft. (Lanka concerned over Chinese-built LTTE arms with strap line SLN rocket fire disabled LTTE attack craft––The Island June 24, 2007).

GoSL briefed China on LTTE efforts to procure large stocks of arms, ammunition and equipment in early 2007. China responded positively to the request. (LTTE bid to tap top Lankan arms supplier foiled with strap line Government acts as multimillion dollar deal if finalised––The Island Feb 21, 2007). Sri Lanka intervened after the LTTE had received at least three consignments of armaments.

The SLN believed that the LTTE could have procured what it required via a circuitous route. At that time, speculation was rife that Chinese weapons could have been procured using North Korean end-user certificates. On Feb 28, 2008, the navy destroyed an LTTE ‘floating arsenal’ on the southern high seas, leading to the recovery of some mortars and artillery shells (130 mm and 152 mm) of Chinese origin. A few weeks before the Feb. 28 confrontation, the navy seized a 22-foot-long fibre glass dinghy mounted with one 14.5 mm single barrel anti-aircraft gun and a multipurpose machine gun also of Chinese origin following a battle off Baththalangunduwa (Tigers’ North Korean link bared?-The Island March 5, 2007).

Subsequent to The Island revelation, the North Korean Embassy in New Delhi assured the GoSL that it wouldn’t help the LTTE to procure arms. The North Korean mission told the SL mission in New Delhi that it had no connection with the LTTE, while claiming an international plot to derail what North Korea termed as smooth progress of six-party talks aimed at denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and also to drive a wedge between North Korea and the GoSL.

The LTTE had plenty of ready cash to procure weapons and hire those whom it considered as experts in the field. Kumaran Pathmanathan alias ‘KP’ now under house arrest, confirmed the existence of a vast LTTE procurement ring, which enabled the organisation to acquire whatever it needed. The LTTE never hesitated to take risks in its endeavour to acquire sophisticated weapons, as well as new technology. The LTTE believed that it could off-set Sri Lankan military’s numerical superiority by deploying state of the art armaments. The LTTE could have bought over influential officials as well as those on retirement to work on their behalf. The arrest of five persons, including retired Indonesian marine General Erick Wotulo by US agents for planning to ship arms to the LTTE revealed the link. The GoSL’s battle against the LTTE received a mega boost from US action to thwart LTTE efforts to procure weapons. Whatever US criticism of accountability issues in Sri Lanka, the GoSL should be grateful for crucial assistance, including information on the LTTE shipping fleet. The Rajapaksa’s government made a determined effort to improve relations with the US to counter the LTTE threat as it knew the US support was crucial for countering LTTE efforts to procure weapons overseas and transfer them to Sri Lanka, using a fleet of vessels.

LTTE leadership obstacle to peace

President Rajapaksa’s government also entered into the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in March 2007 regardless of opposition by some political parties. Also known as ‘NATO Mutual Support Act’, ACSA highlighted the relationship between the US and SriLanka. In fact, some constituent parties of the UPFA expressed concern over the growing relationship between SriLanka and the US. The LSSP was one of those concerned by the agreement. It called for revelation of the agreement (LSSP wants military agreement with US published––The Island March 11, 2007). Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa emphasised the importance of US action targeting the LTTE in a brief interview with The Island, immediately after having talks with visiting US State Department official Steven Mann and the then US Ambassador in Colombo, Robert Blake. The meeting took place in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the ACSA, which was discussed with the previous administration headed by Ranil Wickremesinghe (2002-2004). Rajapaksa told Mann that the LTTE leadership was an obstacle to peace, therefore it had to be wiped out (No halt on offensive against LTTE; Lanka seeks more US support to stop arms flow––The Island March 11, 2007).

The GoSL dismissed criticism directed at it over the finalisation of ACSA. The JVP and UNP, too, criticised the UPFA move. The UPFA reminded the UNP that during Wickremesinghe tenure it had finalised an agreement with the US not to surrender each other’s citizens to the International Criminal Court (Govt. UNP initiated military logistical agreement with the US––The Island March 15, 2007).

On March 18, 2007, the LTTE suffered a one-two punch when Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), destroyed two of its floating warehouses on the high seas before they could transfer their cargo to multi day trawlers belonging to the Tamil Nadu fishing fleet. The LTTE lost two ships earlier on Sept 17, 2006 and Feb 28, 2007. The destruction of two more ships on March 18, 2007 caused a major shortage of ammunition, prompting the LTTE to step up its efforts to procure weapons overseas. They experienced two major obstacles. On one hand, the SLN had carried out a series of successful attacks on its floating warehouses as well as trawlers, including those owned by Tamil Nadu deployed to transfer weapons from big ships to shore (LTTE suffers double blow on high seas; Faces critical shortage of ammunition––The Island March 19, 2007).

The GoSL could never have brought the LTTE to its knees without destroying its arms procurement network, including its Tamil Nadu support base (Lanka targets Tigers’ overseas procurement network––The Island March 21, 2007).

The issue of the LTTE obtaining Chinese arms from a third party came up for discussion, when a UNP delegation visited Beijing in May 2007, on the invitation of the Chinese government. The UNP delegation, led by its leader Ranil Wickremesinghe rapped the GoSL for investigating a Chinese link in LTTE arms procurement operation. The GoSL insisted that it had never investigated a possible Chinese link, though it brought credible intelligence to China’s attention as regards LTTE working through North Korean agents to secure equipment (Arms to LTTE: Govt rules out Chinese link; China thanks UNP for boycotting Belgium confab of the Tibetan separatist movement––The Island May 21, 2007).

The LTTE also obtained weapons from Eastern Europe and various other sources. A case in point is the acquisition of Russian built heat seeking ground to air SAMS, as far back as during the deployment of the IPKF. The LTTE successfully fired SAMs against British built Avros as well as Russian built AN 32 during earlier phases of the conflict. After the liberation of the Eastern Province, the military recovered a 22.7 pound SAM-14 aka Stela 3 buried in the jungles of Thoppigala. Stela 3, which has a larger warhead, is the successor to SAM 7. The IPKF recovered one SAM-7during its deployment here (1987-1990). At the onset of eelam war IV, the LTTE made an attempt to procure SA-18, also of Russian origin, to bring down Kfirs and MiG 27s. After the liberation of the Eastern Province, the army recovered about 20 big guns, including two 152 mm artillery pieces and over a dozen 120 mm and 81 mm mortars. (Intelligence op. led to missile recovery-The Island Aug 2, 2007).

The LTTE was never short of ammunition for its big guns whereas the military always was plagued by shortages of ammunition and spares.

After the conclusion of the conflict, there was intense speculation of the LTTE also obtaining Chinese armaments, using Eritrean end user certificates, a charge denied by Eritrea. The LTTE never experienced a shortage of arms, ammunition and equipment, until the SLN targeted its floating warehouses on the high seas and trawlers carrying armaments from big ships to Sri Lanka’s northern shores.

(Next installment on Aug 29 will examine US assessment on Sri Lankan military on the invitation of the then UNP-led UNF government. The unprecedented US report is the only one of its kind made during eelam conflict).

DMPPF wants Pillay to question LTTE on atrocities

DMPPF wants Pillay to question LTTE on atrocities

 

By Ifham Nizam
The Dead and Missing Persons’ Parents’ Front (DMPPF) yesterday urged UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navaneethan Pillay to hold a credible inquiry, taking into consideration the gruesome crimes committed by the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE), without concentrating only on the final stages of the war.
DMPPF Convener Ananda Jayamanne told a media briefing in Colombo that Pillay should question all former LTTE members including those now holding key positions in the present government.

He said: "It is of paramount importance that these people are questioned on war crimes. Parties with vested interests are doing their utmost, with the support of Tamil Diaspora, to revive the brutal terrorist outfit. It is we who lost our kith and kin, apart from the soldiers. We strongly believe that questioning former LTTE key figures would be crucial, failing which we would be dragged back into a similar situation."

Jayamanne said LTTE members Vishwanathan Rudrakumaran, Vinayagam, Rev. Emanuel, KP, Pillaiyan and Karuna should be questioned on war crimes.

Madivani Sugandhi, a widow from Jaffna said "I humbly request Madam Pillay not to listen to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which is not telling the truth at a time we are just starting to live peacefully after brutal activities of the LTTE, which resulted in hundreds of women, like me, losing their husbands for not agreeing to join the LTTE or when they wanted to leave it."

She also said that the LTTE had destroyed all her certificates, which she termed as a common occurrence during its rule. "We earnestly don’t want to see the terrorist outfit raising its ugly head again. We sincerely hope Madam Pillay would strongly consider the marginalized people like us," she added.

Thirteen-year-old Abdul Saeed Raida said she had lost both her parents at the hands of the LTTE. "My mother was killed in front of me. Now, I am with my aunt who has three of her own children and finds it very difficult to make ends meet. I urge the government to support me to carry on with my studies. Now, I am a grade eight student and want to be a doctor," she added.

Terrorism, Extremism and Hypocrisy April 16, 2013, 5:40 pm

Terrorism, Extremism and Hypocrisy

 

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by Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

LTTE Terrorism: Musings of a Catholic Priest is a timely publication at a time of increasing polarization. It is a collection by Rev Fr Vimal Tirimanna of his writings over the last few years about the conflict that has torn Sri Lanka apart. It continues to do so even now, despite the destruction of the LTTE, precisely because the balanced and essentially religious approach Fr Tirimanna advocates is lacking, conspicuously so in many of those who claim to be religious.

In his introduction Fr Tirimanna notes how the Catholic Church also contributed to the problem, through the failure of many of its members to strike a convincing balance. He notes the reason for this, when he claims that it was ‘certainly the right thing to do’ to aim for balance. But the failure to condemn LTTE terror openly, ‘on the wrong presumption that it would hurt the Tamil sentiments’ as he puts it, led to the Church losing its credibility.

Fr Tirimanna is unequivocal in his condemnation of terrorism, and he argues with great erudition and the citation of numerous authorities that the Catholic Church can have no truck with terror. At the same time he makes clear his understanding of the reasons for terrorism, and notes the need to deal sympathetically with the grievances of the Tamils that were the result of the majoritarianism he also condemns. Indeed he makes it clear that democracy needs to be inclusive, and that in the modern world ‘special consideration’ is needed for the minorities and that they ‘need to see themselves as being protected, especially in the Constitution of the country’.

Through this clear enunciation of principles that promote pluralism, Fr Tirimanna makes clear the destructive impact of the fundamentalist assertions on either side, namely ‘ that Sri Lanka belongs only to the Sinhala Buddhists and that north and east of Sri Lanka is exclusively the Tamil homeland’. He shows also the need for sensitivity to avoid conveying such perspectives, as when he wonders whether it was appropriate to celebrate victory in battle through a tamasha at Independence Square – while categorically asserting the moral obligation of the government to liberate areas held by the LTTE, and noting that the security forces deserved credit for their achievement. In short, he never loses sight of the distinction between the LTTE, which he felt had to be defeated militarily, and the Tamil people on whose behalf too the government was acting. This needed – and still needs - to be conveyed, and he makes clear again and again the need to bend over backwards to get this message across.

With regard to the LTTE he notes both the moral need to have negotiated, and the equally valid moral need to deal with them conclusively when they had made it clear they had no interest in negotiations. In this regard he makes clear the flawed approach of the Wickremesinghe government, though his harshest criticism in this regard is reserved for G L Peiris, whose equivocations over this period he condemns roundly – ‘what happens is that at the end of every session of the peace process between the government and the LTTE, the government spokesman comes out with a rosy picture which is full of equivocation, then, he also never hesitates to attribute exclusively to himself or to the government the "immense success" of the peace efforts. When those of us who have not been victims of amnesia can still recall that it was the same gentleman who for some six years painted a similar rosy picture not only of the economy but also of the peace process of the then PA government, one wonders what sort of credibility the government commands with regard to the peace process. This sort of calculated hoodwinking and avoiding of vital issues may not last long, for people have a limit to their patience’.

This President’s patience with Prof Peiris seems to have no limts, as was the case with both his predecessors as Heads of Government. What is even more tragic about this is that he should be taking the lead, given his experience in the field, with articulating the government’s ‘vision for a political solution to the national crisis’, which Fr Tirimanna notes Robert Blake, in the days when he was more on our side than not, recommended to further isolate and weaken the LTTE. Prof Peiris does seem to understand one way in which we should be moving, for Fr Tirimanna quotes from a lecture he delivered in 2010, about ‘a need for power sharing mechanism in the Centre as well….There are many ways of achieving that objective, one of which is a bicameral legislature’.

But the total hollowness of the man became apparent when he did not put this idea forward in negotiations with the TNA. After I stressed the need for us to put forward our ideas, he did bring forward a proposal, but he failed to follow it up, just as he failed to follow up on my suggestion about strengthening local government, even though the TNA responded positively to both suggestions.

Another villain Fr Tirimanna identifies, in addition to the extremists on either side he condemns, is the Bishop of Mannar. More circumspectly than he exposed Prof Peiris’s shortcomings, he makes it clear that the Bishop should not have had the Madhu statue removed deeper into LTTE held territory, just as he makes clear that the demand that there be a peace zone around the Madhu shrine was disingenuous given that the LTTE had violated this and was quite likely to ‘reinfiltrate and reoccupy’ it.

The hypocrisy and double standards of those others too who opposed the destruction of the LTTE by our forces is clearly exposed by Fr Tirimanna. He refers to the quite disgusting cover ups of atrocities in Iraq by the BBC and notes Chomsky’s comparison of the coverage of the killing of a priest by the Communist government in Poland with the comparative neglect of the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador, ‘a friendly client state’ of America. He notes the anomaly of condign criticism of Karuna and Pillaiyan by those continuing to urge negotiations with the LTTE, in effect to ‘hand over a part of the country to a ruthless group of "terrorists" who can never be converted’. And he notes that doubtless the Opposition would not have been so harsh on Karuna and Pillaiyan had they joined the Opposition – which is surely true, as I realized when I was urging Ravi Karunanayake to compromise with President Kumaratunga back in early 2004. His point was that there was no need to do so, since that would mean compromise with the JVP, which he thought the public saw as beyond the pale – whereas the UNP together with the LTTE supported TNA was bound to do better in any election if President Kumaratunga had the temerity to call one.

But while Fr Tirimanna is quite clear about the need to have overcome these equivocal approaches to terrorism, and the importance of what the Rajapaksa government achieved in getting rid of the LTTE forces in Sri Lanka, he is also clear about the need for Reconciliation. In the last chapter of the book he looks at length at the LLRC recommendations and makes it clear that government will fail in achieving lasting peace if it does not swiftly act on those recommendations. He talks about the need for both restorative justice and structural justice, and urges swift constitutional reforms that would ensure ‘minority participation in the day-to-day running of the affairs of our nation’.

In short, this is a thorough account of the crisis and its aftermath, sharp in its analysis, affecting in its universal sympathy, forceful in its moral perspectives. But as with all such balanced and principles approaches, I fear that the extremists on either side, and the equivocators he assesses so critically, will continue to dominate us and, to cite the words with which the book concludes, ‘we may be condemned to repeat our tragic history all over again’.

Nepali Maoist had links with LTTE

Nepali Maoist had links with LTTE

 

UCPN-Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal has revealed that his party had ties with Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), also known as Tamil Tigers, during the decade-long armed conflict in Nepal, according to a news story published by the Himalayan Times yesterday.

The HT story said: "In the startling revelation made on Friday, the Maoist leader, who later became the country’s prime minister in 2008, admitted that the Nepali Maoists had sought the LTTE.

Dahal, also called Prachanda in the party, was speaking at a training programme for the officer bearers of Maoist party’s ethnic and regional organisations, in Jorpati of Kathmandu yesterday, the Annapurna Post reported on Saturday.

On the occasion, Maoist leaders Dr. Baburam Bhattarai and Narayan Kaji Shrestha were also present. They imparted training to the party cadres including CC members.

According to him, it was the first time that he was making public the ties between the LTTE and his party.

Saying that the LTTE was also fighting for ethnic liberation, Dahal tried to justify the relationship with the Tamil Tigers. The insurgency in Nepal was a "movement for national liberation", he added.

He further revealed that LTTE had also sought help from the Maoist side.

He was all-praise of the separatist movement in Sri Lanka, and called the LTTE, now defunct, an "organisation of the brave." According to him, the LTTE was revolting against the atrocity.

Though he did not elaborate what sort of help the then CPN-Maoist received from the Tamil Tigers and how the relation was established, Dahal hinted that the LTTE’s support helped a lot to fight against the then regime.

He, however, lamented the Chinese assistance in the suppression of LTTE in Sri Lanka."

Neither North nor East would have PC’s if LTTE was present’’ Senior official refutes Surendiran

Neither North nor East would have PC’s if LTTE was present’’

Senior official refutes Surendiran

 

by Shamindra Ferdinando

A senior government spokesman yesterday said that as usual the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) had conveniently forgotten the circumstances under which President Mahinda Rajapaksa called for the first Northern Provincial Council election.

The official pointed out that GTF spokesperson Suren Surendiran had credited those countries, including India which voted against Sri Lanka for compelling Sri Lanka to call for Northern PC polls. Nothing could be further from the truth, the official said, adding that formation of separate Provincial Councils for the Eastern and Northern Provinces wouldn’t have been a reality as long as the LTTE retained its conventional military capability. People of the Eastern Province had an opportunity to elect their first Provincial Council in May 2008 at the height of the combined security forces offensive in the Vanni against the LTTE, the official said, alleging those supportive of Prabhakaran’s macabre cause strongly opposed Eastern PC polls.

Northern PC polls too, wouldn’t have been a reality in case the government called off the Vanni offensive due to international pressure.

The GoSL spokesperson said that the then British Foreign Secretary David Miliband and his French counterpart wouldn’t have visited Colombo in April 2009 to save the LTTE without intervention by LTTE-run Tamil Diaspora groups. But interestingly, the GTF hadn’t been formed at that time, the official said, claiming that many Tamil organizations, including the GTF as well as the so-called Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) came into being only after the eradication of the LTTE.

Now that Surendiran had thanked India for ‘a little bit of arms twisting’ to compel Sri Lanka to call for Northern PC polls, the GTF should examine the circumstances under which the Indian Army facilitated the victory of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) at the first North-East Provincial Council election on November 19, 1988.

India went to the extent of forming a private army for the EPRLF administration, the official said, accusing the likes of Surendiran of misrepresenting facts. In fact, India should be really concerned about the statement attributed to Surendiran, he said.

The government spokesperson said that the Tamil Diaspora and the TNA should be grateful to President Rajapaksa’s government for giving them an opportunity to freely engage in politics. The official recalled the TNA, on behalf of the LTTE, calling upon Tamil speaking people to boycott presidential election in November 2005.

In the run-up to Dec 2001 parliamentary polls, the TNA had to declare the LTTE as the sole representatives of Tamil speaking people, the official said, adding that the TNA was not even allowed to decide on its candidates. It would be pertinent to mention that a comprehensive report by an EU election monitoring mission released following the parliamentary polls exposed a direct nexus between the LTTE and the TNA, he said.

The EU report examined how the TNA had benefited from a violent campaign carried out by the LTTE in the run-up to the polls and the polling day itself, the official said.

"Let me remind Surendiran that he functions as GTF spokesman only because the LTTE lost the war. That is the reality," the official said.

Dismissing Surendiran claim of colonization of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the official challenged the GTF to reveal specific cases without generalizing. The GTF with the help of the TNA should be able to pinpoint exact locations where new settlers had moved in since the conclusion of the conflict.

In fact, when similar sentiments were expressed by a visiting Indian parliamentary delegation recently, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa asked the delegates whether they could pinpoint at least one such settlement in the Northern region, the official said.

The official said that a forthcoming census would reveal the true ground situation. Slowly but steadily the GTF and the TGTE were losing ground due to rapid progress in the post-war development programme.

Commenting on the GTF’s endorsement of Wigneswaran as the TNA’s chief ministerial candidate, the government spokesman said that the diaspora as well as some of those countries wanting to haul Sri Lanka up before an international war crimes tribunal remained silent when the LTTE was running the show.

They turned the other way when the LTTE quit the Norwegian-led negotiating process in April 2003, thereby setting the stage for Eelam War IV in mid 2006. Those shedding crocodile tears for Tamil speaking people never voiced their concerns as long as they felt the LTTE could achieve its objective militarily.

They hadn’t been the least bothered about using children as cannon fodder, the official said. Whatever those living abroad say, saving children from the horrors of war would be enough for the government to win the election if the people were truly grateful.



 

LTTE ANTICS AND THE BRITISH POLICE

LTTE ANTICS AND THE BRITISH POLICE

 

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By Gamini Gunawardane

Rtd.Snr. DIG

Although our national English media appears to have played down the incidents of harassment that had happened in UK during the Championship Trophy Tournament, the social media on the Internet gave us a fair idea of what happened there with visuals and other accounts. It appears that both the Sri Lanka players and the Sri Lankan expatriate spectators who turned up for the matches at Cardiff and London were considerably harassed by the brazen LTTE flag carrying supporters residing in that country where this organization is banned . Even more than the spectators, I suspect this would have affected the SL players, adversely affecting their concentration and mental freedom, when they were intensely engaged in those tight contests of 50 overs duration. Some photographs showed that the players were directly affected. And we know how much strong concentration on the field, especially at the crease, is needed at these critical moments. I do not know whether the mental disruptions caused by these incidents did not have an adverse effect on the final outcome of the semi-final at Cardiff against India. Perhaps that too may have been one of the objectives of the miscreants.

LTTE demonstrators did whatever they thought was right in their perception. I have no problem with that. But my problem is why were they allowed to achieve their illegal objectives by the Tournament organizers, the security organization that was entrusted with this task and the British Police? Needless to say that it is the responsibility of the Tournament organizers and the Police to provide a safe and a peaceful environment to the players and the spectators, conducive to the best display of cricketing talent of the players, to have a successful tournament. I am sure they would have had enough information that the LTTE supporters in that country were making their usual preparations to disrupt the Sri Lanka matches? I do not know whether there was even an apology by the organizers for the indignities suffered by the Sri Lankan players leave alone the Sri Lankan supporters. I wonder whether SLC demanded an apology either. No wonder. We are used take things lying down. Imagine if such a thing happened to the English cricket team in Sri Lanka, in the prevailing context of anti-British sentiment here owing to political reasons? The BBC, Channel 4 and the British Press would not have had anything else to talk about! Sri Lanka Police would have been massacred and vilified for the next two months!!

(When the Navy Commander, Clancy Fernando was killed in a bomb explosion on Galle Face Center Road, a New Zealand cricket team who were staying in a hotel nearby to play Test cricket here, just packed their bags and left the country!)

We too would have been quick to roundly condemn the SLC for their failure and the police of course, as we too are naturally inclined to run down our own and are used to think badly of all that is ours though sometimes perhaps with good reason. But my surprise is why the British Police which we do & like to believe, is a model police service in the world, allowed such a situation to come about as a professional organization and are not ashamed of what happened. It cannot be that they lack the necessary competence to prevent such incidents. It was over 25 years ago that we, when following the Overseas’ Command Course at Police Staff College, Bram’s-hill, that they showed us how they handled football violence on their grounds with minimum fuss. What they did was to have a closed circuit TV network covering all the stands of a stadium, divide them into sectors and monitoring them with just one or two persons manning the consoles. If they noticed any active trouble makers or potential trouble makers anywhere, the monitors would alert the men on duty at the relevant sectors with details of location. They would then keep a close watch on the person or persons concerned, pick them up with minimum fuss without disturbing other spectators and throw them into a mobile police cell to cool off. And they got us to do simulated exercises giving different scenarios on how to handle situations even such as the collapse of a spectators’ stand. By now, I am sure they may be having more sophisticated methods in place.

Back in Sri Lanka, I tried to be a little innovative at Asgirya, when I chose to use our Canine Division, then under Wije Seneviratne SP, to deploy Police dogs in strategic positions around the grounds, to run after those who rush to the middle of the playing area. Up till then, it was the police officers who had to run after them, much to the amusement of the spectators. Now it was the turn of the police to have their laugh, when the miscreants ran all over for dear life, while the handler watched from the boundary lines! The secret was this. The average Sri Lankan is scared of Alsatians while in Western countries, they pet them. In this case, the mere presence of the canine officers and announcement of their purpose did "cause the mob to desist" as stated in the Constable’s Manual, under the principle of minimum force, long before they came to teach us Human Rights. Besides this, I had the Mounted Division standing by to be seen by all, to be deployed if need arose, to augment in crowd control. I did not have the usual Riot Squad behind the scene. So everybody was on their best behaviour, peacefully enjoying the cricket. Police had no anxieties. The mounted men had a chance to watch the match free on horseback from a vantage position!

A different approach was adopted years later at the Khettarama grounds when several Western teams participating in the 1996 World Cup decided to give a miss to matches to be played in Colombo on security concerns. India and Pakistan played a joint match with Sri Lanka to dispel the fears of other countries. I was then DIG in charge of the Ministers’ Security Division. The security of the teams, both on and off the field was the responsibility of the MSD. This was at the height of LTTE activity in the city, in Northern and Eastern Theatres and of course in Colombo . The challenge was to show the world that Sri Lanka Police was capable of running these matches incident free despite the LTTE threat, a situation similar but far worse than what prevailed in England recently.

It was easier to do this at Khettarama than elsewhere as that venue was compact. All spectators were body frisked on entry, they were not allowed to bring in things like cigarette lighters and boxes of matches or anything that could be used as missiles. No liquor was allowed. The boundary lines were closely manned. As close circuit TV was rare and expensive at that time, I used a pair of binoculars, seated in the Control Room, both to detect potential trouble makers, LTTE activists as well as alertness of my own men on duty. Importance of identity checking in English venues had been lax since it is now revealed that an Ex LTTE cadre who is wanted and gazette for terrorist offences had been among the demonstrators at Cardiff. He was the type of person who may not hesitate to cause physical harm to or intimidate a Sri Lankan player. Given the liberal traditions of the British, it is not advocated that all spectators should have been body frisked at these venues, but the LTTE activists and sympathizers were easily identifiable and their conduct were observable by enforcement authorities as they were either dressed in clothes indicative of their sympathy with LTTE or were displaying/wearing LTTE emblems and also by their behavior. The enforcers had only to either prevent them from entering and or watched their behavior closely and reacted . That was legitimate action because the LTTE is a proscribed Terrorist organization in Britain. In some of the photographs available, we could see the way the security/police personnel who were on duty were indifferent in their approach and where they acted, how slovenly they were. Is this the British Police that is supposed to be the model police service in the world?

There was information of at least one incident where, outside the venue, a Sri Lankan expatriate lady and her daughter were harassed and intimidated. Here in Sri Lanka we secure the venue, its precincts and the neighbourhoods with three rings of police foot patrols superimposed with mobile patrols equipped with radio communications thrown round the larger area to be ‘sanitized’. That is in addition to civil clothed surveillance & intelligence network coverage. Why did not the British Police do these things when it was fairly obvious by previous experience alone that such activity at cricket venues where Sri Lanka figures? This is especially in the back ground in the paradox that Britain is harbouring LTTE activists in their midst despite the fact that it is a banned terrorist organization. I thought lack of accountability is only a feature in countries like Sri Lanka. Where is the accountability of Britain which is demanding accountability from Sri Lanka and is said to come here to participate in the forthcoming CHOGM hoping to drive home to us the importance of such values? Isn’t this a case where we are justified in demanding, ‘physician, heal thyself’?

True, some seven of the offenders are reported to have been prosecuted and punished. The question yet remains why no satisfactory arrangements were made to ensure that those offences did not happen when there was every opportunity to prevent such incidents?

I am stuck by the slovenly way the security personnel/police were trying to arrest these miscreants on field. I am further struck by the way police personnel are watching the behavior of the LTTE activists, with resignation and folded arms. All this is an indication of an attitudinal problem - either their lack of resolve or apathy. Is this the British Police that we knew?

I recall that sometime ago, when our President was invited to address Oxford Union, that the British Police had informed the organizers that they could not ensure the safety of our President there and advised against holding such event. Even at that time I told myself, ‘Is that a tenable admission by a law enforcement authority who is giving the impression that they are the model police in the world? Can a law enforcement agency with any professional pride afford to make such an admission of inefficiency? This is contrary to basic principles of VIP security. Our police are held to be no good by our own people who despise them. Have they (police) ever publicly admitted that they were unable to handle any task despite having to handle even militarized tasks during the past 30 years of armed terrorist conflict? Has the models turned upside down, I begin to wonder.

Unlike the Sri Lanka Police which is under the thumb of the political party in power under an Executive Presidential system, I believe the police in Britain are more independent to the extent that a mere traffic cop there could charge Princess Margaret for a traffic offence as matter of routine police work. In such a country why do the police adopt an emasculated attitude when it comes to enforcement of their law against the LTTE and in providing security to the Sri Lankan cricket team and the President himself ? As a rational person, one could think of two possibilities. One is that the British Police is massively bribed at decision making levels by the unlimited illegal funds of the LTTE. I am thinking of the recent Kerry Packer scandal in England. The other possibility is that despite their avowed independence, the British Police establishment is influenced by the negative policy of the British government pressurized by a Tamil diaspora electorate and brainwashed by their skewed propaganda.

WHO PLANNED THE EELAM WAR?

WHO PLANNED THE EELAM WAR?

 

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KAMALIKA PIERIS

After World War II ended in 1949, several countries got together to debate the issue of war. This gave them the opportunity to outlaw war and create agencies to settle future conflicts peacefully through negotiation. Instead of doing this, they ‘legalized’warfare through the ‘Geneva Conventions.’ Armies could shoot and kill each other. These countries then enlarged the scope of lawful war to include wars within states (civil wars). They announced that ‘national-liberation-movements-fighting-against-alien-occupation-and-racist-regimes-in-the-exercise-of-their-right-of-self-determination’ were entitled to take arms and use force. This gave the green light to both genuine and bogus liberation movements.

The western powers saw civil war as a useful political tool for intervening in sovereign states, partitioning them and controlling the segment useful to them, such as the east of Sri Lanka with access to the Bay of Bengal. These internal wars were therefore labeled ‘conflicts between sovereign states’, making the existing government an aggressor instead of the legitimate ruler. The ‘liberation movement’ was permitted to engage in terrorism. Terrorists were ‘lawful combatants’. International law said terrorism was outside its scope and wriggled out of the issue. Thanks to all this, rogue secessionist groups could now seize territory by force and get it recognized as a separate state in the UN, using ‘friendly countries’

It is now suspected that the Eelam war was not a home grown war. It was masterminded by outside forces. A group of Jaffna boys who had never left Jaffna and who did not know English styled themselves ‘Liberation Tigers’ and said they were seeking ‘self determination’ for their ‘nation’. They went to war with little training but somehow managed to get territory and hold it. How did they do it?

The LTTE did receive some sporadic training. India trained them in the 1980s. Norway had provided training at the Special Forces training camp in Rena on weapons tactics and military strategy (2003). Norwegian ex -Special Forces had trained Sea Tigers in underwater demolition in Thailand. Instruction on conducting the war could have come from abroad. The VSAT high frequency equipment acquired by the LTTE in 2002 could transmit voice, pictures, video without any interception by anybody.

But the main reason LTTE was able to defeat the army was because they had superior weapons and explosives. They had a continuous supply of highly sophisticated weapons sent by a weapons procurement network operating from a foreign country. They were able to procure armaments from all over the world and transfer them across borders without any difficulty.

LTTE had a formidable array of weapons, far superior to those owned by the Sri Lanka army. They had at least 30 pieces of heavy artillery. Also assault rifles, self loading rifles, light machine guns, sub- machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, anti aircraft weapons, such as surface to air missiles and peddle guns. A four barreled air defense gun with a range of 2,000 meters was found by the Sri Lanka army. This was a formidable acquisition and the army wanted to know where it came from.

LTTE was not a lawful army; therefore they smuggled in the weapons, including heavy items, by carrying out mid sea transfers 200 nautical miles off Sri Lanka. They used special semi submersible submarines, capable of carrying 10 tons of equipment. Other items such as power generators also came in. LTTE had a fleet of 50 ships, and was managing two dozen ships at any given time. Sri Lanka wanted the International Maritime Organization to investigate how the LTTE managed to operate this fleet when it was a proscribed organization. They also wanted the countries which provided flags of convenience investigated.

Large hauls of arms was recovered from Mullaitivu, Vakarai, Vishvamadu, Wellamulliwaikal beach, Panichchankerni jungle and Alanchipotha. Arms were also found in Kumana National Park. Troops found six boats laden with 996 kilos of explosives at Puthukkudiyiruppu, 1,004 kilograms of C4 plastic explosives at Mollikulam, over 80 varieties of bombs at Iranamadu and two other stocks of explosives, elsewhere, weighing 2,500 kilos and 3,900 kilos. ‘The amount of weapons found is unbelievable,’ said the army much still remains to be recovered. These could not have been only for Sri Lanka.’

There was a ‘navy’ with fast attack craft fitted with powerful outboard motors, radar and communication equipment. These had been smuggled in. ‘Indumathi’, a 16-metre long wave rider class boat, had a mounted twin-barrel anti-aircraft weapon and multi purpose machine guns. LTTE also had pedal type suicide boats and stealth craft laden with explosives. They had also tried to mine the sea, using limpet mines, pressure mines and closed circuit diving equipment

Certain findings indicate that LTTE was preparing for a massive sea battle. Two huge torpedoes with launchers were recovered from Puthukudiyiruppu, ready to attack a ship. The navy wanted to know who purchased these and how were they brought into Sri Lanka? Under international law only governments can purchase torpedoes. Four submarines were found in an ultra secret factory there. Interpol was asked to find out how advanced equipment from Switzerland and Norway came to be fitted into these submarines.

LTTE started an ‘air force’ of small, fixed wing aircraft. ‘Air Tigers’ were added to ‘Sea Tigers’ and ‘Sea Pigeons’. Three Czech built Zlin 143 planes came secretly from South Africa. These arrived by ship in knocked down condition and were brought ashore in large trawlers. Of the seven airstrips built by the LTTE, Mullativu could accommodate large aircraft. The military wanted to know where the heavy machinery needed for its construction had come from

The Army Commander was asked on ‘Thulawa’ how did the LTTE acquire the knowledge to run this war? Were they helped by foreign countries and NGOs? This was a frequently asked question. His answer was ‘yes.’ Sri Lanka Army said foreign military experts had come in and provided training and advice on weapons. The heavily fortified defenses of deep ditches and strong bunds behind which the LTTE hid in Eelam War IV, could never have been constructed without external help, Ukrainian specialists came and trained LTTE in sea warfare. Japanese experts came, developed submersibles and built a camouflaged tunnel for launching these in a high security zone in Puthukkudiyiruppu area. Sri Lanka Air Force stated that foreigners came and trained the LTTE in using planes. South African pilots are expert in night air raids and its mercenaries could be easily hired as trainers.

It is suspected that NGOs, who had worked with LTTE, had helped in the war. Equipment belonged to Oxfam and Save the Children were found in a high tech satellite communication facility at Puthumathalan. Troops found 20,000 litres of petrol in Iranamadu and Puthumathalan area also a massive stock of diesel and kerosene oil in Dharmapuram, in plastic barrels which could hold 225 liters of fuel each. Only NGOs had the authority to transport fuel to LTTE areas.

Western countries had refused to help the government win the war. Britain had refused to provide spare parts for army’s aging Saladin and Daimler armoured cars. US and NATO also refused. Army then bought Cadillac armored cars from USA, but the US did not provide the number agreed and only gave six, without the turret and gun, ‘though we had paid for them.’ Britain provided ten 30 mm guns with 6,000 rounds of ammunition but refused to deliver 2000 more rounds which had been agreed. Certain countries had not allowed aircraft carrying war

items to fly over their airspace. The government had to search for a country which would ship the Bushmaster guns bought from Russia. Finally Poland agreed to allow the use of its port.

When it became clear that the government was going to win the war and the LTTE was going to lose, President Rajapaksa came under heavy pressure from western powers, to suspend the offensive and resume ‘peace talks’ with the LTTE. When Kilinochchi was taken, (January, 2009) US, Norway, UK and France exerted pressure. India, UK, France wanted the war stopped in April 2009. There was also an appeal from Japan. These countries were trying to save the badly cornered LTTE.

USA has also worked behind the scenes to get the LTTE leadership to surrender to a third party. About two months before the final battle US had offered to evacuate the top LTTE leaders and their families. There were secret negotiations to take away Prabhakaran, Sea Tiger wing leader, Soosai, intelligence wing leader Pottu Amman and their families, numbering over 100. The US Pacific command sent a team of experts to look into this. USA feared that if Prabhakaran was arrested by the government he would tell them how the west helped him in the war.

LTTE committed serious war crimes throughout out the Eelam wars. USA, UK, European Union, Japan India and the UN did nothing to stop them and never censured their actions. However, according to a report filed by Times Online, the US military has used satellites to spy on Sri Lanka during the final stages of its battle against the LTTE. India too deployed aircraft fitted with sophisticated equipment to monitor the war. US sought to justify its action on the ground that it was looking for evidence of war crimes.

WAR CRIMES OF THE LTTE

WAR CRIMES OF THE LTTE

 

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by Kamalika Pieris

The LTTE committed many serious war crimes during the Eelam wars. Here are some of them. To start with, there are prohibitions regarding recruitment into an army. The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict forbids the enlistment of anyone under the age of 18 into the armed forces. According to the UN, the LTTE recruited 6,905 children. They were forcibly taken away from their families and placed in the front line. A large number died in battle. Child soldiers rescued by the army refused to go back to their families. "They can’t recognize their parents. Some don’t even know their names," the army said.

LTTE violated sacred norms of war. International law prohibits the killing of soldiers who surrender (ICRC Rule 47). The LTTE executed 200 soldiers captured during Pooneryn army camp attack (1993). LTTE burnt alive hundreds of Sri Lankan soldiers who had surrendered during Mullaitivu army camp attack (1996). LTTE desecrated the bodies of soldiers killed at Kalmunai. (1990). There is a UN Convention against Torture. Jeevan Base had four torture cells. A torture chamber was found at Puthumathalan.

LTTE violations regarding the safety of civilians in war zones have not received the attention they deserve. International Humanitarian Law prohibits the use of human shields and the taking of hostages (ICRC Rules 96, 97). LTTE used civilians as human shields in the battle at Dharmapuram. The children and families of women cadres were placed in the frontline in battles so that the state military could be charged with civilian murder. In 2009, LTTE spectacularly used 200,000 Tamils as hostages moving them from place to place. When these hostages ran away from the LTTE, LTTE fired on them with machine guns.

Impersonating soldiers of the other side by wearing the enemy’s uniform, and fighting in that uniform, is forbidden. LTTE posing as elite police commandos fired at a bus killing 11 Sinhalese including 2 children at Arantalawa (1996). LTTE cadres dressed in military uniforms, shot dead 127 Sinhalese civilians, at Habarana, including 31 police and security force personnel who were traveling in three buses and two trucks to Trincomalee. They stopped the vehicles and dragged out the passengers and shot them dead with automatic weapons after brutally assaulting them with clubs. Over 70 with injuries were airlifted. The dead included many children and 12 off-duty security personnel. Most of the victims were families visiting their relatives for the New Year. (1987)

The use of chemical weapons and poisons is prohibited in war (ICRC Rules 72, 73). LTTE used chemical weapons against Gemunu Watch at Nachchikudah. Chlorine gas was used at Kiran and tear gas was fired from launchers at Akkarayan. The use of tear gas is prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Cans of poison gas were found buried in Puthukkudiyiruppu. Tippmann A-5 guns, capable of firing deadly chemicals were also found.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines bans the use and stockpiling of mines. LTTE heavily mined the approaches to their territory. More than 770,000 anti-personnel land mines have been recovered so far. Mine attacks killed and maimed many armed services personnel. ‘We amputated a lot of legs.’ said the surgeons. LTTE devised a mine which damaged a soldier’s leg in such a way that a prosthetic could not be fitted to it. Mine manufacturing factories were found in Mullativu. Mines were stockpiled. A cache of 1,093 mines emerged at Govipal Aru area, Ampara. Another cache had 18,000–20,000 mines.

Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I prohibits acts of violence intended ``to create terror among the civilian population". LTTE ignored this. There were ambushes and killings. Twenty-five civilians who were traveling in a lorry from Negombo were ambushed at Kokuvil by LTTE cadres, who killed 14 of them.

LTTE used bombs to create terror. Bombs were placed on roads, buses, trains, in post offices, railway stations, once in a department store. Bomb explosions in the south were in predominantly Sinhala populated areas. Tamil populated areas such as Kotahena, in Colombo, were not bombed. LTTE bombed Central Bank building, killing more than 100 and wounding about 1,400. Four simultaneous bombs exploded in Colombo-Alutgama train resulting in 64 deaths and 400 wounded. A bus carrying 140 civilians in Kebithigollewa was bombed. A powerful Claymore-type roadside bomb, packed with explosives and ball-bearings hit a passenger bus at Buttala, killing 27 civilians and wounding 67 others. Passengers who ran out of the bus were shot.

Suicide bombing is universally considered a crime. LTTE used suicide bombers to attack vital locations (Katunayake), installations (Kolonnawa), institutions (Central Bank) and public places where crowds gathered. These persons exploded themselves on roads, buses, trains and at public functions. They rammed into their targets using truck, jeep, motorcycle and once even by rickshaw. There were suicide divers as well using underwater scooters, fishing boats and stealth craft. These ‘Black Tigers’ were glorified as’ ‘highly motivated, well trained, able to get at heavily guarded targets’. But military specialists point out that the suicide bomber is a tool, not a hero. He is given sleep inducing drugs, and then trained to obey a handler and respond to trigger words. The handler activates the bomber at the right time.

There are ‘protected’ places which cannot be attacked in war. Additional Protocol 1 (1977) prohibits attacks on installations and vital institutions. LTTE bombed Central Telegraph Office, attacked Kelanitissa power station, Kolonnawa, Orugodawatte oil storages, gas storage, Muthurajawela. Placed of religious worship are also protected sites. Attacks on them are considered criminal acts (ICRC Rule 38, 40, Hague Convention 1999). LTTE did not target churches, kovils or mosques, only Buddhist sites. A truck with explosives was sent into the Dalada Maligawa. Samudragiri Vihara, Illankathurai was destroyed. Stupas at Verugal, Kalladi and Toppur were used as communication towers. It appears, also that heavy weapons were installed at Thoppigala. Kumbakaranamale Chaitya, Ampakaman, was used as a food store and Wedivetttukallu Chaitya was used as a bunker.

There are ‘protected persons’ as well, whom soldiers are forbidden to kill (Geneva Convention IV). They include Buddhist monks. LTTE targeted Buddhist monks. Kitulagama Seelalankara Nayaka Thera of the Dimbulagala Forest monastery was assassinated in 1995. In 1987 armed LTTE cadres ambushed a bus taking Buddhist monks on a pilgrimage, ordered the bus to Arantalawa jungle, and killed the chief priest and all 30 samanera monks in a brutal manner, using swords, guns and machine guns. One monk was permanently disabled. LTTE also targeted worshippers in Buddhist temples. In 1985, LTTE entered Anuradhapura main bus station and opened fire with automatic weapons, killing and wounding civilians who were waiting for buses. The LTTE cadres then drove to the Sri Maha Bodhi and gunned down worshippers, killing 146 persons including children. Somawathi vihara was attacked twice. The second shooting was done to discourage pilgrims coming to the temple on Esala Poya. A bomb killed 23 and injured 70 at a Buddhist temple in Batticaloa during Vesak in 2000. The bomb that exploded in an Anuradhapura-Kandy private bus at Dambulla (2008) was to be exploded at Ruwanveliseya when a ‘pichchamal pujawa’ was in progress with thousands of devotees taking part in the ceremony. The informant who had carried the bomb had been accompanied by her mother and sister, all posing as Buddhist devotees going on pilgrimage.

ICRC Rule 88 prohibits discrimination against any particular ethnic group. LTTE systematically attacked Sinhala civilians. LTTE cadres killed 12 Sinhalese villagers working at an irrigation canal construction site in Omadiyamadu, close to Welikanda in Polonnaruwa district (2006). In 1986 and 1987 LTTE ambushed three buses in Polonnaruwa district, separated the Sinhalese from the others and murdered 127 of them. In Pulmoddai LTTE stopped a private bus, removed the Sinhalese and killed them. 25 Sinhalese passengers travelling by bus on Potuvil-Moneragala road were shot dead. A private bus was stopped by LTTE cadres, who removed Sinhalese and killed 11 including three policemen. 40 Sinhalese passengers in the night-mail train from Batticaloa were killed by LTTE cadres who stopped the train at Valaichchenai

LTTE attacked over 75 unprotected Sinhala villages in Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts. The main target was Sinhala villages in Trincomalee district. Villagers took to sleeping in the surrounding jungle during the night for safety. Some villages were attacked more than once. Arantalawa, Mahadiulwewa, Namalwatte and Serunuwara were attacked twice. Wadigawewa thrice, Morawewa four times. Many of those killed were women and children. Pregnant mothers were specially targeted.

LTTE killed in a brutal manner. There were massacres in the Sinhala villages of Morawewa, Gomarankandawela, Kantale, Ganthalawa and Seruwila. In 2009 ten civilians including children were killed at Rathmalgaha Ella near Rathugala in Inginiyagala and 21 Sinhala villagers at Kirimetiyaya on the Bibile-Ampara road. At Kithulutuwa 127 men, women and children were slaughtered. At a press conference to discuss the film ‘Gamani,’ a speaker who had lived in the threatened villages said that the situation was far worse than what had been shown in the film. The film shows only little of what actually happened.

At Arantalawa, LTTE cadres armed with swords, machetes, clubs and small-arms killed 27 to 28 civilians including women and children, in a night house-to-house raid at Arantalawa. Pregnant mothers were found hacked to death. Their necks were slashed. Armed LTTE cadres stormed Serunuwara village, herded the farming families at gunpoint on to a road and shot them there in execution style. At Morawewa, villagers were brutally tortured before they were murdered. At Sagarapura a house-to-house massacre was carried out. They hacked the adults with sharp instruments and clubbed children to death in front of their parents. They looted the houses and set fire to them, burning the wounded victims alive. At Godapotta LTTE, surrounded the temple and attacked a gathering of over 175 villagers who had met to discuss a new temple.

 

Gotabhaya tells Pillay: US had no moral right to move Geneva resolution

Gotabhaya tells Pillay:
US had no moral right to move Geneva resolution

 

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By Shamindra Ferdinando

Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa has told United Nations Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay that the United States of America had no moral right to move a resolution targeting Sri Lanka at the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in Geneva.

The Defence Secretary pointed out the irrationality in the US action in the wake of atrocities committed by its forces in various parts of the world. The US twice moved resolutions in Geneva condemning Sri Lanka after an abortive Canadian bid to humiliate the country.

The Defence Secretary met the UN delegation, headed by Pillay, at the Defence Ministry on Friday.

Asked whether Pillay had responded, the Defence Secretary said that the UN delegation remained silent. "Obviously, Pillay couldn’t have endorsed my criticism of US action, though the entire world knew of death, destruction and instability caused by the super power," he said.

The Defence Secretary said that Pillay’s silence reflected the difficulties experienced by the UNHRC in dealing with atrocities committed by US-led Western powers. The bottom line was that Pillay would remain as UN rights chief as long as she didn’t antagonise the US, the Defence Secretary said.

Whatever the criticism of the government inviting the UN rights chief to visit the country, the week-long visit would have definitely helped Pillay to realise the ground situation, the Defence Secretary said. In fact, Pillay’s visit facilitated government efforts to dispel intense propaganda which depicted the Northern and Eastern Provinces as ‘closed military zones’ even four years after the conclusion of the conflict, Rajapaksa said.The Defence Secretary said that visiting foreign dignitaries had been misled by those working overtime to destabilise the country. "During our meeting at the Defence Ministry, the UN Human Rights commissioner alleged that the government had removed road blocks in the Northern Region just ahead of her visit. She was convinced the government would temporarily do away with road blocks during a visit. Obviously, she was misled by the UN mission here or those who had met her here. I told her there was absolutely no need to do that. In fact, the number of road blocks should have increased during VIPs’ visits to guarantee their security."

Asked whether Pillay had raised the much-talked about allegation that 40,000 people had been killed during the final phase of the war on the Vanni east front, Defence Secretary Rajapaksa said that he was very surprised the UN delegation had refrained from referring to the killings. Had she taken up the matter we would have asked her to furnish information regarding them and questioned the basis for the allegation, the Defence Secretary said.

Responding to a query, the Defence Secretary said that Pillay had been here on a fact finding mission and her mandate was to examine accountability issues in relation to the resolution moved against Sri Lanka at the UN. However, she had ended up taking up petty political issues at the behest of those who couldn’t stomach the eradication of the LTTE, he said. The Defence Secretary alleged that Pillay had declared that post-war Sri Lanka was moving towards an authoritarian state with democracy undermined and the rule of law eroded to appease those in the Opposition subservient to their foreign masters. "We are having elections at four different levels; presidential, parliamentary, provincial council and local government. People have the freedom to exercise their franchise to get rid of the government in power. It is unfortunate the likes of Pillay are blind to the ground reality and tend to issue statements without examining facts," the Defence Secretary said. According to him, somebody in the Opposition had got Pillay to call Sri Lanka an authoritarian state. "Those who feared to call Prabhakaran a terrorist, happily describe the President as a dictator. The people are not blind to such machinations."

Commenting on Pillay’s allegation that those who had demonstrated against the government and criticised the ruling coalition would be targeted once she left the country, the Defence Secretary said that during Friday’s meeting he queried whether people would join the protest organised by the TNA in Jaffna if they really felt they could become targets. They protested because they knew nothing would happen to them, he said.